Andreas Follesdal
4 Securing Equality and Citizenship under European Integration 
Introduction
The important objectives of education to equal citizenship must be rethought under European integration. One central obvious reason is that the notion of citizenship itself is reconfigured.  National citizenship is supplemented, since all citizens of member states of the EU are also Union citizens.  Europeanisation also raises questions about what kind of equality is required among Europeans, given the ideal of equal citizenship.  In particular, is there good reason to insist of equality of education among Europeans – and if so, equality of what? Should the same knowledge base and citizenship virtues be taught across state borders and religious and other normative divides? 
	International human rights treaties illustrate the challenges. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) states that the equal and inalienable rights of all include the right to education, where “ Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity..” (Art 13)
	The Convention on the Rights of the Child is even more specific both as to the objective of equality and the specific contents: 

1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, 
c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity (Art 28) 
1. States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to: 
a) The development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential;…
b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations;
c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own;… (Art 29)
European integration raises perplexing issues of equality and citizenship anew. They require us to pay sustained attention to at least three philosophical issues: a) What does multiple democratic citizenships beyond the nation state require among equals? b) How can we respect diversity yet secure such equality, and while we seek to inculcate commitments to justice and virtues of citizenship?  c) What are the reasons for insisting on equality of education – of various kinds - among political equals living in a Union, as compared to a unitary state?
	The following reflections address some of these challenges. I shall argue that the expansion of the European political order has several implications for the content and standards of obligatory education. All must enjoy a high minimum level of education, and all pupils must be informed concerning the various ways of life prevalent in Europe.  Furthermore, there must be standards for securing equality of opportunity across the EU, though it is difficult to measure under multiculturalism. Citizens must also be socialised to certain 'citizenship virtues’. One important reason is to promote trust and trustworthiness in the population. 
	This shared basis to be taught in schools should avoid contested religious or philosophical premises as far as possible. Yet the school system should socialise pupils to three commitments: to the just domestic and European institutions and hence the legislation they engender, to principles that justify these institutions; and to a political theory that grounds these principles in a conception of the proper role of individuals, of member states and of the Union.
	I shall also argue that equality of result is not a plausible normative requirement among Europeans, while equality of opportunity is. This objective is especially difficult to measure under conditions of multiculturalism that are likely to prevail in Europe.
	Section 1 introduces citizenship beyond state borders, historically and in the European Union. Section 2 explores further the intricate connections between citizenship and trust to defend the need for inculcating at least certain values. We then turn to consider some commitments that citizens must share, in section 3, and we sum up several reasons for education in section 4. Section 5 explores reasons for equality among compatriots, and Section 6 considers several challenges to this account of equality and citizenship at the European level. The chapter concludes with some comments on the lessons to be drawn for ‘Global’ citizenship.
1 On citizenship – Domestic, Cosmopolitan and European
Talk of citizenship beyond state borders is not new. Competing conceptions emerged in ancient Greek and Roman political thought. When asked which was his country, Socrates insisted that he was a citizen of the world, rather than an Athenian or a Corinthian. Likewise, when asked where he came from, Diogenes answered that “I am a citizen of the world”.  There would seem to be little legal need to choose between these two conceptions for Socrates and Diogenes. Athenian citizens - a privileged set of free men - enjoyed active rights to political participation.  But the citizenship beyond the city-state did not include any legal rights beyond borders. Yet  Diogenes appealed to his cosmopolitan citizenship to deny any local obligations, including duties to pay taxes. Is dual citizenship legally possible, or must we choose between such sets of legal rights and obligations?
	In comparison, the Roman Empire recognized and even encouraged dual citizenship with loyalty both to the local community and to Rome. This arrangement allowed citizens of Rome freedom of movement and trade within the Empire. Still, the Roman notion of dual citizenship had its drawbacks both for the individual and for the political order. To be a citizen of Rome usually only provided status or passive citizenship in the form of protection, rather than active citizenship rights to political participation enjoyed only by the patrician class. Dual citizenship also created dual loyalties in the populations of the Empire, causing unresolved conflicts (Toynbee 1970, Clarke 1994). Can European Union Citizenship avoid these legal and moral tensions of multiple citizenship? 
	European Union Citizenship is closer to the Roman practice than to the Greek vision of cross-border citizenship – for better and worse. Union citizenship carries clear legal implications fostering freedom of movement and trade, and is intended to supplement, rather than to replace, national citizenship. Yet dual citizenship requires the European Union, its member states, and its citizens to come to grips with challenges of institutionalisation, and the tensions among multiple loyalties. Reflection on these roles and challenges of Union citizenship also illuminate some issues regarding global citizenship – still more of a moral idea than a legal grant of active political rights. Both Union citizenship and global citizenship create aspirations to a democratic political order with a scope beyond existing states, and face challenges regarding institutions and political culture aspiring to treat all affected individuals as equals. 
European Union Citizenship
Union Citizenship was a conceptual innovation of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, reaffirmed most recently in the Constitutional Treaty agreed by the European Council July 18, 2004, but stopped in French and Dutch referendums (Art II-8). Every person who is a national of a Member State of the Union is also a Union citizen. 
	Union citizenship confers four main rights. They include both protections – passive rights – and some political controls – active rights, including:

–	The right to move freely among, and stay in, other Member States;
–	The right to vote and run in local and European Parliament elections in the Member State where one resides. The European Parliamentarians are elected directly by citizens of the various Member States, forming a representative body across state borders. Through successive treaties, its power over Union legislation has gradually increased. Union citizenship enhances the political rights to the European Parliament of those who have exploited the opportunities for mobility.
–	Protection in a non-EU country, by the diplomatic or consular representatives of other Member States if one’s own Member State is not represented;
–	The right to petition the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman, and to address and get answers from Union institutions in any of the official language.

The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) clarified the relationship between national and Union citizenship. Union citizenship does not replace national citizenship, but shall complement it. Yet important questions remain: how should it be taught, and how can citizens maintain and exercise dual political loyalties once created? In particular, when citizens exercise their Union powers to vote, should they pursue their own interests at all times, those of their co-nationals, or promote the interests of all Europeans. If the latter, what does justice require among Europeans? Or should they vote according to their sense of global justice, possibly promoting equality among all citizens of the world?
	To alleviate some of these issues it is helpful to reflect more systematically on the multiple reasons to value education, and the content of education to citizenship in particular. We start with the question asked by philosophers for thousands of years, a question also asked by many young Europeans every morning: What is the point of going to school?
2 On Citizenship and Trust in the EU
Several scholars hold that Union Citizenship was introduced precisely to foster trust among citizens of the Union, and to engender popular support and allegiance to Union institutions and policies (Closa 1992: 1155; Shaw 1997; Wiener 1997, Follesdal 2001b). 
	The need for such popular support has increased with the expansion of EU activities and powers. Community-level institutions increasingly shape the lives, circumstances and aspirations of Europeans. Moreover, Union law enjoys status as a new legal order, exercising direct legal authority over Europeans (Weiler 1991; MacCormick 1997). Many citizens and organisations were critical of the increased powers of Union-level institutions partly because they appear to be beyond the control of any single accountable government. This legitimacy deficit hindered trust among Europeans and prevented compliance with common rules.
	Several aspects of Union institutions make trust in other Europeans more important. As the Union increases its influence and changes its decision rules, individuals and government representatives are required to adjust or sacrifice their own interests for the sake of other Europeans. One example is that it is national governments that implement EU decisions and directives. If Union legislation is perceived as ‘interference’ or an improper imposition on domestic government, and this becomes widely suspected abroad, it will be very difficult to secure compliance. 
	Another example concerns veto powers. Vetoes intended to protect vital interests easily lead to deadlock in the absence of trust. Majority voting also requires trust. The minority that loses in decisions is required to act contrary to their own interests, possibly against the majority of their fellow domestic citizens, out of respect for the majority decisions made in European institutions (Scharpf 1997: 21). Minorities must also be confident that the majority will take their interests into account (Taylor 1969; Barry 1991). Likewise legislators must be trusted by each other, and by the populations, to consider the impact on all Europeans when making law. This requires that political parties and party families in European Parliament – and voters - must be trusted to consider the plight of non-nationals.
	Mutual trust is central to ensuring a stable political order over time, in several ways. Trust is important when individuals must co-operate but will only do so if they expect the others to do their part. Suspicion that others will exploit rather than reciprocate one’s efforts can easily prevent or unravel complex practices of co-operation. Trust is therefore crucial for ‘social capital’ - ‘social connections and the attendant norms and trust’ (Putnam 1995: 665; Loury 1987; Coleman 1990).
	To prevent suspicion and ensure stable cooperation, actual compliance is not enough: each must also appear trustworthy, so that others can count on their compliance (Hardin 1996). I submit that institutions such as those of the European Union can be an important means for fostering trust and trustworthiness even among strangers, by engendering impersonal reciprocity, of the form: 
I’ll do this for you, knowing that somewhere down the road someone else will treat me in the appropriate way.
Such impersonal reciprocity is fostered by confidence in the general compliance with social institutions – including abstract, aggregated political systems (Inglehart 1970; Giddens 1995). Institutions can monitor and sanction defection, thus reducing the temptation to free ride. In turn, this reduces the likelihood of defection by those who do not mind co-operating as long as they are assured that others do likewise.  A further important source of such confidence is inculcation to certain norms and values by public educational institutions. 
	Social practices and institutions rely on norms of impersonal reciprocity, but can also foster them - though slowly (Putnam 1993: 184; Rawls 1993: 168). Institutions enable cooperation and shape individuals’ strategies, but they can also shape our identities - how we conceive of ourselves, our values, norms and interests. This is another way that institutions can create and sustain trust. They shape individuals’ interests and perceptions of alternatives, and can foster trust in others’ benevolence (Becker 1996). Trustworthiness is further enhanced if individuals do not act on the basis of calculations, but instead are socialised to regard certain behaviour as obvious and appropriate (Stinchcombe 1986, March and Simon [58] 1993, Olsen 2000).
	These remarks suggest that one fundamental challenge to the future European Union is to ensure that Europeans develop and maintain trust in one another and in their common institutions, particularly insofar as the Union increases its power and decides by qualified majority voting. Europeans must have reason to believe that they all comply with common laws, and that their new institutions and rules deserve compliance.  
	I venture that one important function of Union Citizenship can be to bolster such trustworthiness, by fostering citizenship virtues.
3 The Basis of Citizenship 
An often voiced objection to Union citizenship as a facilitator of trust is that this is implausible. It is unrealistic to believe that Europeans will act on feelings of solidarity and charity across hundreds of miles (Preuss 1995: 275). The shared culture and common heritage of Europeans seems too thin to support the required trust, especially when compared to the national heritages bolstering compliance within the European welfare states. There is no ‘demos’ in Europe (Preuss 1995), no shared sense of destiny or broad set of common values. Indeed, the search for a common ethnic or cultural base for ‘belonging’ worries many Europeans, due to the memory of past wars based on such grounds.
	However, a ‘thick’ common basis of shared beliefs, values and traditions is not needed. There are states without ‘thick’ shared values and sense of community. Instead, I submit that a satisfactory account of Union citizenship need not build on a broad base of common identity, culture and history. It can build on a shared sense of justice and more limited commitments to the equal dignity of all Europeans, motivated by a ‘desire ... to arrange our common political life on terms that others cannot reasonably reject.’ (Rawls 1993: 124; Ackerman 1980:69ff.; Weiler 1995; Preuss 1996: 275; MacCormick 1996: 150; MacCormick 1997: 341; Habermas [98] 98).  This is not to deny that Union citizens also need information about European history and culture, so as to understand the impact of political decisions on Europeans of different faiths and cultures. But such information should not be mistaken for inculcation to the broad set of historically shared values. 
	Another challenge for European citizens is that such trust and loyalty to fellow Europeans must co-exist with trust and loyalty to co-nationals within the same member state. Citizens must thus have two political loyalties that must co-exist. This is not impossible – to the contrary, we find many federations able to instill and maintain both sub-unit loyalty and ‘overarching’ loyalty among the citizenry ({Simeon & Conway 2001 #35280}). I would again hold that these problems are manageable.  The curriculum is shaped so as to promote both forms of loyalty rather than only furthering one political identity – either to the member state or to the Union.
	On this view, the motivating force for complying with rules is not centrally a feeling of altruism, but rather a sense of justice, a preparedness to comply with those institutions that apply to us and that are just (Rawls 1980: 540). Day-to-day compliance with laws and other commands is required by the duty to honour others’ legitimate expectations, and the sense of justice as it binds us to the institutions that surround us. This is a different motivation for individuals’ compliance than ‘sentiments of affinity’, the emotional bonds between individuals. 
A central question to this account is whether this inherently ‘abstract’ sense of solidarity based on universalistic principles of social justice can motivate, and be sustained over time (Preuss 1995, 275). In response, we may note that even existing nation states are usually too large to foster empathy and sympathetic concern for the  wellbeing of all others (Calhoun 1996: 3; Goodin 1988). Still they seem to enjoy support from their citizens. The account sketched below assumes this more ‘impersonal’ motivation: a sense of justice, an interest in doing our moral duty and expressing respect for others, rather than a sense of community, ‘thick’ identity, or a feeling of empathy toward all Europeans.
	I submit that to maintain durable trust among citizens they must be habituated to three sets of commitments. 
Commitment to Institutions
Firstly, citizens must be committed to their institutions and the decisions and rules that their officials make. In practice, this means that they must generally be prepared to abide by the laws and other rules that apply to them. In this way they respect the legitimate expectations of those around them who depend on their compliance. In Europe, this requires knowledge both of domestic and community legislation.
Commitment to Principles of Legitimacy
Citizens must also have reason to believe that others will continue to comply in the future. Such trustworthiness, essential for stability, can be maintained by a publicly known, generally shared commitment to comply for what each person regards as good reasons. The second commitment is therefore to principles of legitimacy for institutions. 
	Principles of legitimacy, duly worked out for polycentric polities, serve several roles in accounting for stability. One is to provide critical standards for assessing existing, concrete institutions. Another is to secure some shared bases for compliance with just institutions, since these principles provide justification for such existing institutions. One such principle may be a specified version of the Principle of Subsidiarity which places the burden of argument on those who seek a centralised decision (Follesdal 1998).
Commitment to a Thin Political Theory
The third common commitment is to the immediate premises for such principles, for instance in the form of a conception of citizens as equal members of the polycentric political order. One example of such a ‘thin’ political theory is John Rawls’ suggestion that the social institutions should be regarded as a system of co-operation among individuals regarded for such purposes as free and equal participants (Rawls 1971). That particular conception is insufficient for the challenges facing the European Union with federal features, since the Member States and Community institutions split and share sovereignty. A shared conception of the proper roles of Member States and the Union seems necessary to allocate powers between them. 
	There are two reasons for this third kind of commitment. A consensus on institutions and principles of legitimacy is insufficient to convince others of one’s trustworthiness regarding future compliance with these procedures. We also need assurance that all regard themselves as having reasons to continue to comply in the future. Moreover, the trust needed in a democratic European Union also concerns the creation of new institutions and legal rules. Such tasks must be guided and seen as guided by a sense of justice, including a commitment to a shared conception of the equal standing of Europeans within the polycentric European political order.
4 Four Reasons for Education
In light of these commitments to institutions, principles and conceptions of citizenship, I submit that education should have at least four aims.
a Education to Self Knowledge
One task of the school must be to foster the ability of each student to live a life she finds meaningful, compatible with her own world view. She must be made able to explore and exploit her talents and opportunities alone and together with others. Each student must thus gain understanding about their talents, strengths and weaknesses relative to the constraints and opportunities the social institutions will provide later in life. Geographical and personal variation suggests that there must be quite a lot of local adjustment and variation across locations and persons to secure this educational objective. At the same time, with increased mobility across Europe, Europeans will require more knowledge about the varieties of opportunities offered. 
b Education as a Tool
Education can give us the background knowledge for our choice of further studies, careers, and pursuit of interests, and for participation in politics. We must know about the possibilities and constraints provided by society and the natural environment around us. One important challenge is to prepare the students of today for the European and global society of tomorrow, where there will be a need for more citizens with higher education to secure the Union’s vision of a “Knowledge society”. The ability to adjust career plans and a willingness to retool and retrain are crucial skills to be taught.
	In addition every individual needs to be familiar with central cultural frames of reference. We must determine what we hold as important common cultural components – including some understanding of the Christian, Muslim, Jewish and other faiths, familiarity with the history of the European states, and the heritage of arts and crafts of the local region. We must also come to grips with what citizens of tomorrow should have in common with regards to culture when laws and regulations are to be made democratically and responsibly – both domestically and at the European level. This need for information about the prevalent cultures poses an important challenge to teachers: how convey the beliefs and practices of the majority and minorities to all citizens, without influencing them unduly? This topic is addressed in section 4.
	Education in these two senses is a tool both for the individual and for others. Educated citizens can lead better lives, and may contribute to a better democracy and better use of resources. 
c Education as Ticket
For many students education and academic evaluations also function as tickets of admission to higher education and positions of authority. For this purpose education – and good grades – is by necessity a scarce good. They are positional or status goods that by their very nature cannot be distributed equally. In the mythical city of “Lake Wobegone” (Keillor 1995) all children score above average. In Europe, student’s relative position will matter for access to higher education. Education for this purpose cannot be secured equally for all. However, insofar as evaluations are such tickets, they should be calibrated across Europe – as indeed planned in the Bologna process. 
d Education to Citizenship
Finally, citizens need a common set of norms and virtues – the norms and virtues of citizenship, for lack of a better name. They include respect for others, respect for democratic decision-making, truth, toleration, and some others. The claim is that this basis must be known to be common grounds in order to maintain a just society – both domestically and with regards to the European Union, and not least to promote a more just global order. Moral education, also in the schools, must thus aim to foster general acceptance of these civic norms. This goes beyond conveying information about which norms and values are dominant in the society, to foster such character traits. 
	We face two risks when schools seek to foster virtues: Too little, and too much. The educational system must ensure that close to all citizens have the characters necessary for a stable and trusting just society. Moral relativism or self-interest is not enough. But the power of schools and teachers to educate must not be abused to shape individuals’ character more than is necessary for a just society: citizens may disagree about many components of the good life, and still live in harmony and mutual respect. This may for instance be done by stimulating discussions among students of different faiths and world views, who nevertheless should agree on these citizenship norms and values (Roth 2001).
	Some may object to any attempt at inculcating values through the use of public power. In response, we hold that there are good reasons for general acceptance of a limited set of such virtues regardless of important differences on other issues among conceptions of the good life. One central argument in support of this claim is the need for trust and trustworthiness among citizens.
5 On Equality
We now turn to the central issue of distributive justice among nationals, and among Europeans, as concern education. If the commitment to institutions securing equality regarding education extends only among citizens, there may be no normative defence for intra-European distributive justice. Or, inversely, if norms of equality should apply among all Europeans, what room is left for special obligations among compatriots of a single Member State? 
	Many of us hold that the social institutions at large and schools especially, must secure and express equality in some sense or other. This finds expression in the ICESCR. 
	At least in one fundamental sense the ideal of equality seems correct.  The equal dignity of all must be secured by the social institutions. That is, they must be defensible to those subject to them as participants and contributors of equal worth - domestically, within the EU, and as subjects of global economic and political structures.  This commitment to equal respect finds expression, for instance, in the claim that individuals should never only be treated as means, but also always as ends with intrinsic worth.
	But this abstract commitment does not give clear answers with regards to how institutions should be structured. In particular, it is not obvious that abstract equal dignity also requires equal treatment, equality of results, or some other form of real equality. Nevertheless, with regards to the schools, many agree that important tasks of the school are to reduce social inequality, it should further equality among the sexes, and among different ethnic and cultural groups. Should education also be provided equally, and promote equality, across European member states. And if so, what kinds of equality should be secured?
	This question is of practical importance. Society must secure the equal worth of all, among individuals with different talents and interests, and in different local environments. At the same time it is difficult to secure local and individual adjustment of the education, if the content of tests and criteria for evaluation are the same for all. So an important question concerns what kind of equality is important at the national – and European – level, and in which areas do equal dignity require local and personal variations?
	Satisfactory answers must consider several challenges. Firstly, many European states have populations who share a fairly homogenous majority culture but with minorities with divergent religious or cultural values. We should therefore consider very carefully how to secure equal dignity when some groups are more equal than others.
	Secondly, other ideals than equality should be secured – and may conflict with equality. For instance, where should teachers allocate scarce resources? It seems implausible that teachers give all students attention sufficient to bring them to a middle grade, and actively prevent excellence. On the other hand, unless the egalitarian ideal is made clear and its scope of application identified, we risk that teachers make what we presumably would agree are decisions – for instance, to give all their efforts and attention to the worst off students in an attempt to bring them up to the level of the other students. This may be detrimental to all other students, to the teacher’s long-term commitments, and be problematic for the knowledge base and competitiveness of European work force in the long run. 
	A final practical concern is that the focus on the responsibilities of families, the schools and teachers will require increased documentation of efforts, opportunities and assessments provided to each student. Such documentation requires clear minimum standards and operational levels of achievement regarding the appropriate kind of equality. 
	On reflection, the ideal of equality of result does not seem a defensible ideal for education, neither domestically nor for Europe. Good arguments for equality in the educational system seem instead to support two other ideals: equality of opportunity and securing of certain minimum level.
	All should have the same chance to obtain higher education, regardless of social, ethnic or geographical background. Schools have an important task of securing equality of opportunity, but this is very different from equality of result. An important normative and pedagogical challenge is to determine whether equality of opportunity has been achieved in a society with marked pluralism of conceptions of the good life. With different values, individuals may have the same opportunity set but select differently among those capabilities in ways that should be respected.
Some minimal thresholds of knowledge and competences should also be secured for all students. This is a plausible view – but has little to do with equality as an ideal.  An important task for researchers, politicians and teachers is to determine these minimum standards to be secured in schools, for all future citizens of Europe. This is of outmost importance if we are to resolve dilemmas concerning where to allocate important resources and attention.
	These two objectives emerge when we consider carefully some other possible arguments against various forms of inequality.
a) Remove Destitution and Dire Need
One fundamental claim of justice is that the social institutions should secure a minimum level of living for all. Education is important to achieve this, particularly in complex societies with extensive division of labour. We need education to get work, which we need in order to get money. Moreover, we need education about the social structures available to us when we need help. 
	This is an important aim of education, but it does not support claims to equality. Instead, it requires that the educational systems bring everyone up to a level of knowledge and skills sufficient to meet their needs, mainly in the labour market. 
b) Remove Stigmatising Status Inequalities
Some forms of inequality appear as a public stigmatisation, difficult to accept if we are also committed to the equal dignity of all. In earlier times in much of Europe, higher education was only available to men, and mainly to those whose families could afford secondary education. To be excluded from education opportunities for reasons of gender or poverty may be perceived as such a public expression that these citizens are inferior. 
	Note again that the argument from stigmatisation does not rule out all inequalities, but only those that are indefensible. Certainly citizens whose education fails to equip them with certain skills, character traits and knowledge would have reason to feel inferior.  But again, this is not really an argument for equality: there is no clear sense in which the students are made equal as a result. Again, the aim is instead to bring all above a certain level, and to ensure that it is accessible to all, as stated in ICESCR Art 13.2.c: 

Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education
c) Avoid Domination
A third reason to worry about inequalities is the fear that those in power can dominate the rest of us: control our options, our choices, and perhaps even our self-understanding. Lack of education, or drastic inequalities in the quality of education, can result in such domination. 
	We can prevent domination in at least two ways. One strategy would be to allow inequalities in education, but prevent them from having worrisome consequences by ensuring that education does not serve as a tool to obtain influence. This may require that education no longer serves as a ticket to professions and positions of power. However, this arrangement seems neither feasible nor attractive. To remove the risk of domination by the educated by decreasing the value of education would easily entail to dumb down those in positions of power and influence. The question should rather be what criteria and training is most appropriate for those in authority. An alternative strategy seems better: to remove the sources of worrisome inequalities through provision of education for all up to the level required to prevent domination. This strategy may indeed require some limits on the differences in levels of competence, in effect justifying constraints on permissible inequalities. Note that insofar as European integration entails that some Europeans may dominate others across member state borders, differential education levels across the EU may have to be kept within limits.
d) Secure Fair Procedures
Many goods and burdens are distributed by procedures, such as markets, courts, etc. If such arrangements are to function acceptably, the participants must often start from positions of rough equality. For instance, all those who need something in the market must have something to barter, all sides using the judicial system must have access to competent legal advice, and so forth. With regards to education, this concern applies in at least two areas: to secure the common interests of society at large – all of us –, and in order to secure fair treatment of individuals. 
	Let’s assume that the distribution of higher education should be based only on the talents and interests of the students, expressed by grades and requests for admissions, rather than be distributed according to inappropriate criteria such as gender or social background (Rawls 1971). Given these relatively uncontroversial claims, then primary and secondary education must be available to all, regardless of geographical location, gender, ethnic or social background. Special efforts may be required to secure that such selection procedures work according to plan. 
	Similar considerations can be made regarding the need for a well-educated public if a democracy is to work fairly. Democratic arrangements require that all affected parties have access to public debates, or at least that their interests are represented during the process of mutual accommodation and understanding. This requires a fairly high level of minimal education in the population.  
	Such arguments may constrain acceptable differences in starting positions, possibly requiring extra efforts to favour those with special educational needs. We should scrutinize the impact of differential access to education, with regards to the students’ later ability to function as democratic citizens on a footing of equality. Again, European integration may require a higher level of education if democratic procedures are to work well across member state borders, since citizens must be able to communicate and comprehend the plight of Europeans across borders.
e) Equal Distribution of Products of Cooperation
A further argument for equal shares is that those who participate equally in producing goods also have equal claim to benefit from them. I suggest that this claim can support equality of access to professions and positions of power in society. 
	Such goods as professions and institutionalised power are in an important sense created through our joint practice as citizens. Educational resources – professionally trained teachers, pedagogical materials - are goods created through common efforts, that all therefore have fundamentally equal claims to. A principle of fair distribution of such goods would seem to be that all should have equal access to these goods. At least their access should be independent of differences that are irrelevant for the social benefits of having such positions in the first place. I submit that equality of opportunity expresses such a basis of distribution. The criteria for access to positions of power must seek to benefit the society at large.
	Such an argument for equality holds for those goods that can be regarded as produced through cooperation – at the domestic, European and global level. 
	We have considered five arguments for various kinds of equality and against various forms of inequality. We have not found any argument for equality in general, and no argument for equality of result – there is no reason to come to Procrustian conclusions that conscientious teachers should distribute their attention and resources so that all their students get the same grade on exams.  
	In the absence of other arguments, then, it seems that equality of result within the educational system does not seem required – even though we are committed to maintain an educational system that respects the equal dignity of all. 
	However, the minimal threshold that all students should enjoy with regards to knowledge, skills and citizen virtues is high, particularly in a complex, democratic Europe.  There are important limits on permissible inequalities, stemming from the need to prevent domination and to secure fair procedures, also across Europe. And equality of opportunity is important: students with similar talents should obtain similar chances to go on to higher education and professions. 
6 Five Challenges
I have argued that education to European citizenship requires the inculcation of several citizenship virtues, including a sense of justice, and information concerning the broad range of values and circumstances prevalent in Europe. Education must be provided to all citizens securing a high minimal threshold of knowledge and skills, securing equality of opportunity across Member States. 
	We now turn to consider three objections to this account, and two challenges.
a) Multiple Citizenship – Conflicting Loyalties?
Historically, citizenship has often been regarded as exclusive. Many states have traditionally prohibited multiple citizenships, perhaps from a fear that individuals will otherwise suffer from conflicting loyalties and split identities. Union citizenship is explicitly a second citizenship, supplementing rather than replacing citizenship in a Member State. This might be thought to foster mistrust rather than trust, insofar as Union Citizenship will foster split loyalties.
	In response, we can note that the basis of citizenship sketched above is not exclusionary. It does not rely on a broad cultural basis or a thick sense of national identity and pride. It is thus – at least in principle -- compatible with other, concurrent commitments and loyalties. Conflicts may still occur, of course, insofar as the Member State government and Union institutions issue conflicting orders or legislation and there is no final judicial authority. But a clear division of competences reduces such risks, as do clear human rights constraints on legitimate domestic and Community legislation. 
b) What Room for Patriotism and Political Allegiance?
Another objection raises the inverse concern: Perhaps such normative theories cannot justify any political allegiance at all (Follesdal 2004). Consider that the commitment to equality is universal concerning who has moral status: justification is owed to every person in their own right. This feature is typical of moral cosmopolitan views (cf. Pogge 1992, 1994a; Beitz 1994).  Those on the inside of borders thus have the same fundamental moral standing as outsiders, since the similar claims of each count equally, regardless of citizenship. 
	Several authors have noted the tension between moral cosmopolitanism in this sense and special responsibilities toward some individuals: “What I have been trying to dispel is the comforting thought that one can embrace universalism in ethics while continuing to give priority to one's compatriots in one's practical reasoning.” (Miller 1995a: 64). However, the moral contractualism laid out here does not entail institutional cosmopolitanism. It does not require a world order consisting of a universal republic, such that global distributive pattern of benefits and burdens should be independent of the borders of states or other political units. To the contrary, I have suggested above that claims to equality may differ among individuals depending on the risk of domination and their joint participation in the production of goods. 
	Still, there is reason to worry whether such normative theories can account for political allegiance - or lack thereof. David Miller questions whether universalist liberal theories can account for the intuition that "in a national community a case can be made out for unconditional obligations to other members that arise simply by virtue of the fact that one has been born and raised in that particular community." (Miller 1995a: 42; cf. Tamir 1993: 105). Likewise, "the idea that unchosen ties to a community or tradition can carry moral weight may seem, at the very least, completely alien in spirit." (Scheffler 1999: 273).
	In response, recall the threefold bases of citizenship outlined in section 3, in particular the first: Commitment to their institutions and the decisions and rules of officials. Citizens must be prepared to abide by the laws and other rules that apply to them. I submit that a determination of the duties of citizenship, on this view, includes three tasks:
–	Determination of the social facts concerning the institutions. What are the rules of the practice, and are they generally complied with to such an extent as to shape the expectations of those affected? We must determine that this particular set of institutions, and not another one, does in fact exist in the society: these rules, and not another set of rules, are publicly known and generally complied with. Thus a thoroughgoing justification of our duties toward these institutions must refer in part to our shared history, the general acceptance of these rules and so forth.
–	Criteria of normative legitimacy. A determination of whether this practice is legitimate, such that it generates a moral duty on participants to meet the corresponding expectations of others. 
–	Criteria of applicability. Does this practice in fact apply to this person, according to the social facts? A person may be held subject to the practice through consent - e.g. by promising - or held to be subject by being born into certain positions, roles and offices, in such a way that others form expectations of future compliance with the rules.	

These three issues must be addressed in order to determine the duties of citizenship of an individual. For instance, citizens have special duties such as abiding by the laws of their own Member State and of the EU insofar as both include such requirements, are just sets of institutions in the sense of satisfying the relevant principles of legitimacy; and thirdly, apply to that individual. 
	Note that this threefold account is compatible with many views that insist on the relevance of historical and cultural context. Tamir holds that justifications for political obligations must be grounded partly contextually (Tamir 1993: 134). And it would appear to be a version of what David Miller calls Ethical Particularism, an ethical universe "in which agents are already encumbered with a variety of ties and commitments to particular other agents, or to groups or collectivities, and they begin their ethical reasoning from those commitments." (Miller 1995a: 50)
c) Accommodate Difference or Secure Equality?
Can a normative commitment to equality accept inequalities within federations? Political orders with federal elements often exhibit a conflict between the ideals of equality and political autonomy. Such arrangements have been presented as solutions to a wide range of perceived problems suffered by unitary governments, in order to secure peace, institutional innovation, efficiency, liberty and the like. Yet many forms of local autonomy will allow inequality across sub-units, in apparent conflict with ideals of equality. For instance, individuals in different sub-units often enjoy systematically different standards of living conditions, partly as result of the political powers enjoyed by these sub-units. On the other hand, with sub-unit autonomy citizens wield more political influence over the sub-unit agenda than they would have enjoyed under a unitary political order. 
	How, then, are we best to command the commitment to equality expressed in the ICESCR right to education, with respect for sub-unit autonomy?
	In response, note that there are some inequalities that should be of concern, as noted above. The lowest quality of education should still secure a level of knowledge and skills sufficient to equip citizens to secure their needs as participants in a mobile European labour market. Differences in educational levels in Europe must also not allow domination, or threaten European-wide procedures that allocate privilege and positions.
	But can inequalities across member states at all be defended? I believe that there may at least be one reason to defend limited inequalities. The gain in political influence provided by local autonomy and immunity can sometimes be advantageous even for those who are left worse off in such federal arrangements than they would be under a unitary political order (Follesdal 2001a). Their economic and other loss may be outweighed by the variety of benefits provided them by more political power at the local level, due to some sub-unit autonomy. This is especially so if such variations are unavoidable features of the immunity and autonomy required to protect against domination, and to ensure well-informed shaping of institutions and policies to local circumstances. The same interests that ground claims to equality may thus support sub-unit autonomy rather than a unitary political order. If this is true, our interest in equal shares of educational benefits and their economic consequences may legitimately be weighed against our interest in enjoying more political influence over matters controlled by our sub-unit. 
d) Measuring Equality of Opportunity Under Value Pluralism 
The pluralism of values within present European states make it more difficult to determine how far we are from reaching the requirements of a high minimum level, limited inequality of result, and equality of certain kinds of opportunity.
	We often try to determine whether equality of opportunity has been achieved by checking whether results are the same across groups: whether equally many men and women chose various careers, etc.  However, consider the case where different groups in the population have different values and opinions about the good life. Such differences in result might not show lack of equality of opportunity, but rather that there are culturally conditioned choices. For instance, there may be systematic differences among majority and minority citizens with regards to choice of higher education. 
	This may be due to discrimination, lack of understanding by minority citizens concerning how society works, or an artificially low level of aspiration among minority youth. For instance, some studies suggest that youth with immigrant parents are excluded from the job market regardless of their level of formal education. Such causes are highly worrisome, and should be addressed politically and by society at large. However, some differences, such as gender bias regarding career choices might not be the result of problematic socialisation, discrimination etc. Some researchers say that young women with high grades who know that they can choose profession freely, still knowingly choose low paid care professions. Without more information about their perceived choices and deliberations it is difficult to conclude that their choices should cause worry. Instead, one might claim that the problem is the low pay for care professions. 
	We have different conceptions of the good life yet deserve to live under institutions that treat us equal in dignity. It therefore becomes very important to determine who gets to be Procrustes, and determine what sorts of choices should be regarded as ‘normal’, and what should be grounds for worry. 
e) What is the Minimum Content of Education that All should Obtain? 
We need to find agreement about what should be the minimal content of education provided to all – as grounds for self knowledge, as a tool, as a ticket – and not least, for virtuous citizenship.  How much of the religious heritage of Europe must all future citizens of Europe know, in order to function as full and equal members of their society and of the European Union? What must they know about the history – the good and the bad – of their societies? And which are the necessary virtues and character traits we must be sure that all citizens share, if we are to maintain the trust required for stable institutions? We need thorough discussions about these topics – about what must be shared, among individuals who otherwise differ with regards to values, religions, and citizenship. And we need careful reflection about who should have the power to determine this content. Again, someone must be Procrustes, in the sense of determining what should be the minimal content of education provided to all. It seems obvious that the teaching profession should contribute actively to the debate, since teachers are those who must face the dilemmas and make the priorities real-time, in the class-rooms, among students – citizens of the future – who are different, yet must be treated on a footing of equality.  The challenges facing education are immense: the school is not only a school for present children, but also a school for democracy and just societies in the future. The dilemmas identified must be addressed, in the classroom, in society at large, and by politicians. 
	The aim must be to treat students in ways that respect them as equals, and that prepares them to treat each other as equal citizens later on. How to do this – to prepare students for the societies of tomorrow -- is a task that is far too important to leave to the politicians alone. 
7 Lessons for Global Citizenship 
Union citizenship may help clarify the notion and possible political roles of global citizenship. Union citizenship invokes the notion of citizenship. This commits the European political order to the equal standing of all individuals, including democratic control over the institutions that shape their lives. We may call this underlying normative commitment Normative Cosmopolitanism. It is universal in scope, insisting that if someone is affected, they should receive equal consideration regardless of race, gender, social status or citizenship.
	Normative cosmopolitanism does not in itself require global institutions. But those equally affected by practices and institutions should also have an equal say in how the institutions should be shaped. Such arguments apply at the European level: Europeans are now so interdependent due to their common institutions that they must also have an equal say in how they are governed (Follesdal 1997).  The institutions of the Union, including Union citizenship, must be shaped to ensure such democratic accountability.
	This line of argument can serve as a model with regards to claims to institutionalise global citizenship. Globalisation reduces the significance of state borders, due largely to the digital and trans-national economy. Our decisions increasingly affect others across borders, increasing the interdependency of foreigners. Insofar as global regimes have global implications, normative cosmopolitanism requires that they must also be under political control where all have an equal say. The fact of globalisation, if indeed a fact with drastic implications on individuals’ life chances, supports a normative requirement to address the global democratic deficit.
	The requisite legal protections and controls may take at least two forms, reminiscent of the classical distinction between passive and active citizenship. Firstly, there may be institutional arrangements that provide immunity to individuals and communities against severe damage wrought by others. A wide range of human rights and practices of sovereignty are examples of such protections. Secondly, individuals may enjoy institutionalised influence in the form of political rights over the institutions and regimes. National citizenship typically provides both forms of controls. Europeans also enjoy both forms of controls: Passive rights are expressed in the form of European human rights regimes – including the Charter on Fundamental Rights. Active rights are enjoyed in the form of voting rights of two kinds: through democratic control over domestic governments represented in the European Council and Council of Ministers; and secondly regarding directly elected representatives to the European Parliament. Union citizenship ensures the latter political influence to Europeans residing in Member States other than their own. 
	Hitherto, insofar as global citizenship is institutionalised it primarily consists of passive rights in the form of universal human rights standards. Elements of the United Nations may be enhanced to provide equal political influence over various regimes, but such global political rights are not well developed - yet. 
The discussion of Union citizenship indicates that institutionalising active global citizenship faces several challenges.
	Global political authorities do not automatically alleviate the problems of globalisation – to the contrary, they can easily be abused to the further detriment of the powerless. To ensure that a global political order expresses respect for all on a footing of equality, the institutional design is of utmost importance. Moreover, if these decision-making bodies are to enjoy compliance and support, they must be trusted to make just decisions. If they are to be representative, this entails that most global citizens must be committed to a common normative basis. The account of Union citizenship sketched above suggests that such a basis need not draw on a broad shared history and culture. Nevertheless, several commitments must be broadly shared, including a conception of the proper tasks of state governments, regional bodies such as the EU, and global institutions. Such a shared political culture must be fostered, and maintained. The risks of abuse of such global institutions are obvious, particularly in the absence of global arenas for political deliberation and habituation. But gradual development in this direction may still be feasible – and the alternatives may be even worse, judged from the point of view of normative cosmopolitanism.
	Present global regimes regarding issues such as trade, environment and human rights fall short of the normative standards of global justice. These conflicts cannot be resolved by dismissing any attempt at bringing normative political theory to bear. Resources, competence and political will are required to increase the legitimacy of the political orders both in Europe and globally. Reflections on Union citizenship and global citizenship might motivate and guide such changes.
8 Conclusion
I have argued that the important objectives of equality, education and citizenship must be reconsidered and supplemented under European integration, since the functions and ideals of equal education for all co-nationals are challenged by Union citizenship. 
	I have addressed some of the implications of rethinking the reasons for national citizenship in the face of Europeanisation. The expansion of democratic rule to the EU has several implications for the content and standards of obligatory education. All must enjoy a high minimum educational level, and all must know about the various ways of life prevalent in Europe.  Furthermore, there must be standards to measure equality of opportunity across the EU, though this is very difficult to measure under multiculturalism. Citizens must also be socialised to certain 'citizenship virtues’. One important reason is to promote trust and trustworthiness in the population. This concern for trust seems to have fuelled the call for Union citizenship. Similar needs arise at the global level in the wake of globalisation, and global citizenship might be considered a solution. 
	If Union citizenship is to secure trust and trustworthiness in the population, a common normative basis is required. I have suggested that this basis need not primarily focus on a common history and culture and a broad sense. Instead, three commitments may suffice: to the institutions and hence the legislation they engender, to principles that justify these institutions; and to a political theory that grounds these principles in a conception of the proper role of individuals, of member states and of the Union where Member States and Community institutions split and share sovereignty. These three commitments would seek to avoid contested parts of specific religious or philosophical world-views. At the same time, the shared basis goes beyond “Constitutional Consensus” or a “Constitutional Patriotism”, that require consensus on procedures for making and interpreting authoritative decisions (Baier 1989; Habermas [1993] 1998). Agreement on procedures seems insufficient to maintain the mutual trust necessary for constitutional changes and institutional development.  
	The European educational systems should promote such common grounds – while also training pupils to their national citizenship. These common grounds, combined with education providing all citizens with basic information about the prevalent value systems and living conditions across Europe, may suffice to ensure trust and stable compliance. 
	The focus on Union citizenship in the educational system and elsewhere leads to increased concern for standards of legitimacy for the European Union. But the actual institutions and shared commitments fall short of these standards. Insofar as Union Citizenship highlights these deficits it may reduce rather than enhance the support and mutual trust of Europeans. Critics will point out that there are broad discrepancies between the institutions of the European Union, including Union Citizenship, and the requirements of normative political theory. But such deviations are not necessarily a flaw of the theory. That talk of citizenship may increase conflicts, and not only induce support, should come as no surprise: governments have often discovered that citizenship rights have "the potential for exacerbating, as well as diminishing the conflict of classes" (Goodin 1988).
Long-term trust among Union citizens depends on resolving the legitimacy deficit of the Union. However, it remains to be seen whether there is political will and resources for such changes. The Constitutional Treaty, if accepted in referendums, would have increased the possibilities of democratic control over Union decisions. Given the impact of the European Union, the need to enhance active citizenship rights in the form of democratic control is unavoidable.

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AFFILIATIONS
Andreas Follesdal
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights
University of Oslo